信用评级立法干预之争及其评析  

Dispute of legislative intervention of credit ratings and its review

作　　者：封红梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]宁波大学,浙江宁波315211

出　　处：《辽宁公安司法管理干部学院学报》2013年第2期22-26,共5页Journal of Liaoning Administrators College of Police and Justice

基　　金：浙江省社科联课题<信用评级监管法理与制度研究>(课题编号:2012N006)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：信用评级立法干预反对派反对信用评级立法干预的理由是:声誉机制可对信用评级机构产生自动约束;立法干预有违信用评级引用理念,有违NRSRO设立的初衷;对信用评级机构进行立法干预难度大,且具有降低信用评级客观性的潜在风险。信用评级立法干预支持者则认为:单凭声誉机制不足以防范信用评级机构的道德风险;信用评级机构既是干预主体,又为干预对象;立法干预风险不能否定对信用评级的立法干预。本文赞同立法干预支持者的立场,并进一步根据社会中间层理论论证了信用评级立法干预的必要性。The reasons those opposite the legislative intervention of credit rating are： the reputation mechanism can generate automatically constraints on credit rating agencies; legislative intervention contrary to the reference concept of credit rating and the original establishment of NRSRO; legislative intervention on credit rating agencies is difficult and with the potential risk of a lower credit rating objectivity. The supporters think： the reputation mechanism alone is not sufficient to prevent the moral hazard of the credit rating agencies; the credit rating agencies are both the subject and the object of the intervention; legislative intervention risk can not negate the legislative intervention of credit rating. This article endorsed the position of the supporters of legislative intervention and further demonstrated the necessity of legislative intervention in the credit rating according to the social middle layer theory.

关 键 词：信用评级 立法干预 社会中间层理论 

分 类 号：D920.0[政治法律—法学]