基于两阶段动态博弈模型的信用评级轮流机制有效性分析  

Efficiency Analysis of the Rotation Mechanism for Credit Ratings Against a Two-Stage Dynamic Game Model

作　　者：郑又源[1] 何砚[1] 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学金融学院,北京100081

出　　处：《兰州大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第3期106-109,共4页Journal of Lanzhou University（Social Sciences）

摘　　要：构建了一个两阶段动态博弈模型,对《欧盟信用评级机构监管法规》最新立法草案中的"信用评级轮流机制"进行了理论分析。得出在此机制下,后进机构可以有效约束先行机构的行为。根据博弈模型均衡解,分析了影响评级真实有效性的因素,并给出了最优的政策选择和相关的政策建议。A two-stage dynamic game model is built to theoretically analyze the Rotation Mechanism for Credit Ratings listed in the EU Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies.The result shows that regulated by this credit rating mechanism the later joined agencies can effectively constraint the behavior of the early joined agencies.Based on the equilibrium solution to the game model,this paper analyzes the factors influencing the credibility and validity of credit ratings and suggests the most optimal policy options.

关 键 词：信用评级结构 轮流机制 金融监管 两阶段动态博弈 

分 类 号：F830.33[经济管理—金融学]