承接产业转移中我国西部地方政府竞争与经济增长绩效  

Local Government Competition and Economic Growth Performance in Undertaking Industrial Transfer of Western China

作　　者：罗若愚[1] 张龙鹏[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学政治与公共管理学院

出　　处：《中国行政管理》2013年第7期112-116,共5页Chinese Public Administration

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目"区域产业转移中我国西部承接地政府间合作治理机制研究"(项目编号:11BGL074);教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目"区域产业转移合作中地方政府协同治理机制研究"(项目编号:10YJA630108);四川省教育厅盐文化研究基地重点项目(项目编号:YWHZ11-02)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：地方政府竞争的根本动力来自于地区经济增长、权力中心认可和官员自身利益(政治晋升机会)强化,而西部地区微观主体"经济增长需求偏好"的助推则加剧了承接产业转移中西部地方政府间的竞争。博弈模型分析表明地方官员的政治晋升激励制度使得承接产业转移中的地方政府竞争过度,不仅降低了产业转移的经济增长绩效,而且导致了区域间经济差异的持续扩大。基于西部承接地面临的困境,提出通过制度框架规范政府竞争行为,构建西部承接地政府行为模式的导向认知系统,建立政府间合作机制,实现西部区域合作治理、协调发展。The fundamental impetus of the competition among local governments lies in economic growth in the region, the rec- ognition of the power center and their own interests （opportunity for political promotion）. At the same time, micro- cosmic subjects in the west area who have the demand preference of economic growth aggravate the competition among local governments in the western undertaking areas. The game mode shows that the political promotion incentive sys- tem for local officials leads to excessive local government competition in undertaking industrial transfer, which not on- ly reduces the economic growth performance of industrial transfer, but also makes regional economic differences ex- pand. In order to realize the collaborative governance among local governments and a harmonious development in western areas, the paper provides some strategies for standardizing the competitive behaviors, constructing a leading cognitive system of behavior pattern and establishing a cooperative system among local governments.

关 键 词：产业转移 地方政府竞争 经济增长效应 合作治理 

分 类 号：F127[经济管理—世界经济]