基于进化博弈的交通安全分析  

On Analysis of Traffic Safety Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：余孝军[1,2] 罗玲玲[1] 王双[1] 

机构地区：[1]贵州财经大学数学与统计学院,贵阳550004 [2]贵州省经济系统仿真重点实验室,贵阳550004

出　　处：《西南师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2013年第6期35-41,共7页Journal of Southwest China Normal University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71161005);贵州省省长基金资助项目(2011067)

摘　　要：运用进化博弈理论研究交通安全问题,构建交通出行者群体之间以及交通出行者群体与交通管理部门之间的博弈模型及其复制动态方程,并对复制动态方程做了分析与讨论,得到了博弈模型中各博弈方的进化稳定策略,并根据所提出的博弈模型,提出了减少我国交通安全事故的合理性建议.Traffic safety has been investigated by using the evolutionary game theory in this paper. In this paper a game model among the travelers and a game between the travelers and the traffic management de- partment has been presented, respectively. The duplicative dynamic equations of these games have been formulated and solved for stable solutions. Various evolutionary stable strategies have been analyzed and some reasonable advices based on those evolutionary game models proposed to reduce traffic safety incidents in our country.

关 键 词：交通安全 进化博弈 复制动态方程 进化稳定策略 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]