检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
机构地区:[1]中国海洋大学,青岛266100
出 处:《中央财经大学学报》2013年第7期13-19,共7页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
基 金:国家自然科学基金"价格波动分配效应区域差异的微观机制与宏观管理研究"(项目编号70873051)
摘 要:中国地方政府的财政支出结构具有自利性和策略性,这与制度变量财政分权以及晋升激励相关。本文使用1978-2010年的省级面板数据,采用系统矩估计方法,检验了财政分权、晋升激励与地方政府人力资本投资的关系。结果显示:地方政府的人力资本投资存在着显著且正向的跨期关联;财政分权、晋升激励与地方政府人力资本投资呈显著的负向关系以及不容忽视的跨期以及跨区域效应;分税制改革和科教兴国战略的作用截然不同,前者抑制而后者促进了地方政府的人力资本投资热情。Fiscal expenditure structure of local government has the tendency of selfishness and strategic that is related with the Intuitional factor fiscal decentralization and promotion stimulation. The paper apply the provin cial panel data from 1978 2010 and use sys gmm to test the relationship among the fiscal decentralization, pro motion stimulation and human capital investment scale of local government. The result shows: human capital in vestment scale of local government exist the cross time correlation significantly and positively. The decentraliza tion of fiscal and promotion stimulation suppress human capital investment scale of local government remarkably and significantly, at the same time the negative degree exist inter period and inter regional effect that can not be ignored. The role of the tax system reform and the strategy of invigorating the country through science and edu cation is different, the former suppress and the latter promote the investment enthusiasm of local government in human capital.
关 键 词:财政分权 晋升激励人力资本投资 系统GMM
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.249