零售与回收双竞争环境下闭环供应链线性转移支付契约研究  

Research on Linear Transfer Payment Contract of Closed-Loop Supply Chain in Competition of Retail and Recovery

作　　者：高文军[1] 陈菊红[2] 

机构地区：[1]山西师范大学经济与管理学院,山西临汾041000 [2]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710054

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2013年第12期29-35,共7页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

摘　　要：利用博弈理论研究了由单个制造商与n个零售商组成的零售与回收均存在竞争的闭环供应链的协调问题,给出了分散决策与集中决策情形下系统成员的最优决策和收益,发现分散决策使闭环供应链系统收益受损;提出了一种线性转移支付契约,实现了闭环供应链的协调.最后,通过一个数值算例验证了研究结论.This paper researches the coordination problem of closed-loop supply chain with a manufacture and n competitive retailers when there is competition in retail and recovery by making use of game theory, gives system members＇ optimal decisions and revenues in the circumstances of decentralized decision and centralized decision, finds that decentralized decision indicts damage on the revenue of closed-loop supply chain system. Hence, it presents a linear transfer payment contract which can coordinate closed-loop supply chain. At last, a numerical example is given to verify the conclusions concluded in this paper.

关 键 词：竞争环境 闭环供应链 线性转移支付 契约 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F274