小企业贷款困难的激励效率比较规范分析  

A Comparative Normative Analysis of the Incentive Effciency for the Small Enterprise Loan Obstacles

作　　者：赵倩[1] 朱丽玲[2] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学经济学院,四川成都610064 [2]新疆大学建筑工程学院,新疆乌鲁木齐830047

出　　处：《新疆大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2013年第2期37-40,共4页Journal of Xinjiang University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

摘　　要：文章通过供给需求模型分析了当前小企业贷款难题出现的原因,并用福利分析模型比较了贷款利息补贴和风险补偿的效率。研究表明:小企业贷款风险溢价是造成小企业贷款难、贷款贵的主要原因;贷款利息补贴和风险补偿的效率完全相同,都使银行的供给者剩余和小企业的消费者剩余增加,但也都造成社会总福利损失。This paper analyzed the causes that small enterprises had in getting loans by applying the need model and compared the efficiency of loan interest subsidy and risk compensation by applying the welfare model. The study showed that small enterprise loan risk premium was the main cause that the small enterprises found it difficult and expensive to get loans. Loan interest subsidy and risk compensation have the same efficiency, which led to the surplus of bank providers and the increasing addition of small enterprise consumers. This causes the losses of social welfare.

关 键 词：小企业 利息补贴 风险补偿 规范分析 

分 类 号：G112[文化科学]