理性选择制度主义视角下被征地农民与地方政府的结构博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Land-Expropriated Farmers and Local Governments:A Rational Choice Institutionalism Perspective

作　　者：李放[1] 黄俊辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京农业大学公共管理学院,江苏南京210095

出　　处：《江西农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第2期137-142,共6页Journal of Jianxi Agricultural University :Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(12YJA840023);江苏省社科基金重点项目(11GLA002);中央高校基本科研业务费专项;南京农业大学人文社会科学重大招标项目(SKZD201206)

摘　　要：被征地农民与地方政府的征地博弈实质上是一种结构博弈,整体遵照"制度—结构—行动"的路径展开。围绕征地的相关制度安排所形成的"先赋博弈结构"导致了被征地农民与地方政府地位的非对等性,最终使农民成为征地博弈和城市化的最少受惠者和利益最大受损者。要避免征地博弈中农民利益受损,关键在于构建适当的制度安排,在有效制约政府权力的同时,让农民的利益诉求能够通过正常的制度性途径反馈到政府决策中,在制度及其设计中拥有适当的话语权。Rational choice institutionalism stressed system influence with its focus on the system in the game and the policy making process of individual strategy and effect.The article analyzed the game structure and strategy choice in the process of land acquisition between farmers and local governments from the perspective of rational choice institutionalism.The inherent structure of the game resulted in the non-equivalence and non-equality between the land expropriated farmers and local government,which eventually made the farmers the biggest victim of the game and the urbanization.To avoid hurting farmers in land requisition in the game of interests,the key is to create a system arrangement,to restrict the government power,and to allow farmers’a certain right to speak in the system so that their benefits can be fed back to the government in decision-making through normal institutional ways.

关 键 词：被征地农民 地方政府 先赋博弈结构 理性选择制度主义 结构博弈 

分 类 号：F291.3[经济管理—国民经济]