基于公平参数的供应链柔性合同优化策略  

Optimal strategy of supply chain with flexible contract and fairness

作　　者：李建斌[1] 刘凤[1] 雷东[2] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,武汉430074 [2]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2013年第7期1791-1800,共10页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71171088;71131004);教育部人文社会科学基金(11YJC630085);中央高校基本科研业务费(HUST;CXY12M013)

摘　　要：文章从公平的角度研究了供应链柔性合同(收益共享合同和回购合同),以公平作为参与人的私有信息为出发点,在市场需求随机的情况下,就供应商强势、零售商弱势和零售商强势、供应商弱势两种市场占有率情形,分别探讨了公平对收益共享合同和回购合同的影响.研究表明,公平对零售商的订购数量并没有影响,即在完全理性条件下,零售商不会因为个体的公平而去选择偏离市场需求的订购量,但是在公平参数的影响下供应商(零售商)对收益共享合同和回购合同参数的选择范围将大为缩小.文章进一步探讨了在既定的订购量下供应商将倾向于收益共享合同还是回购合同.The paper analyzes the flexible contract in a two echelon supply chain from the perspective of fairness. We treat fairness as retailer＇s private information, and study the fairness＇ impact on the revenue- sharing and buy-back contracts when the supplier has stronger power than the retailer or the retailer has stronger power than the supplier. We find that fairness has no impact on the retailer＇s order quantity, which means the retailer does not choose larger or smaller order quantity in terms of fairness, and the scope of the flexible contracts has been reduced because of fairness. We also study which contract the supplier prefers to when order quantity is fixed.

关 键 词：公平 供应链 柔性合同 随机需求 

分 类 号：U116.2[交通运输工程]