“公司+农户”型订单农业供应链旁支付激励机制研究  

The Study on Side Payment Incentive Mechanism in “Company+Farmer” Contract-farming Supply Chain

作　　者：陈通[1] 廖青虎[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第4期54-57,共4页Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology：Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社科规划基金资助项目(10YJA630014)

摘　　要：订单农业履约率低的重要原因在于公司和农户的利益分配关系没有处理好。采用供应链一般序贯博弈中的旁支付契约设计方法,建立"保底收购+随行就市+利润返还"的旁支付激励机制。通过改变公司与农户的支付函数,使得二者仍然执行两阶段动态博弈的分散决策,子博弈精炼纳什均衡解却与集中决策下的Pareto均衡解一致,并运用Rubinstein-Stahl轮流出价的讨价还价模型对系统的利润增量进行分配。研究表明:"保底收购+随行就市+利润返还"机制具有一定的合理性和可行性,公司、农户和供应链系统都实现了Pareto改进,实现了对增量利润的合理分配,有利于提高订单农业的履约率。One of the causes for the low-fulfillment rate of contract-farming lies in the poor allocation of benefits between company and farmer.This research builds a side payment incentive mechanism of ＂buying at price floor,following the market,profit returns＂ by the method of side payment contract design in supply chain sequential game.By changing the paying function of company and farmer,both sides practise two phases of dynamic game to decentralize decision,while subgame perfect Nash equilibrium has the same solutions with Pareto equilibrium.It uses the bargain model of Rubinstein-Stah1 bid in turn to allocate incremental profit within the system.The study shows： the mechanism that ＂buying at price floor,following the market,profit returns＂ is rational and practical,which helps to improve the company,farmer and supply chain as well as Pareto while realizing the rational allocation of incremental profit,and improving the compliance rate of contract-farming.

关 键 词：旁支付激励机制 订单农业 供应链协调 Rubinstein-Stahl讨价还价模型 

分 类 号：F306.4[经济管理—产业经济]