《逻辑哲学论》中的“无意义”成因探析  

An Approach to the Causation of Nonsense in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

作　　者：赵瑞林[1] 

机构地区：[1]山西大学马克思主义哲学研究所,山西太原030006

出　　处：《山西大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2013年第4期23-27,共5页Journal of Shanxi University(Philosophy and Social Science Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目"言说的困境:<逻辑哲学论>中的‘无意义’问题研究"(11YJC720061);山西大学校人文社会科学研究项目(1009009)

摘　　要：随着新维特根斯坦派的兴起,《逻辑哲学论》中的"无意义"问题在维特根斯坦哲学思想的诠释者中引起了激烈的争论。新派颠覆了正统的诠释,认为无意义的句子的产生不是对逻辑句法规则的违背,而是由于句子的构成部分的意谓的缺乏,并且由此得出了只有一种无意义,那就是纯粹的无意义。文章在系统分析两派观点的基础上,认为这两种诠释路径的实质是自弗雷格以来的语境原则与构成性原则冲突的一种体现,只有将两者融贯为一体才能正确地理解维特根斯坦的哲学思想。Along with the rising of the New Wittgenstein,the question of Nonsense in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus has caused a heated debate among the interpreters of the Wittgenstein＇s philosophy.The new interpretation overthrows the orthodox one,claiming that the nonsensical sentence is caused by people＇s failure to give the meaning to the parts of sentence,rather than by their violation of logical syntax rules,so there is only one nonsense-the plain nonsense.The paper,on the basis of systematic analysis of the above two standpoints,claims that the nature of the two interpretations of nonsense is a reflection of the conflict between context principle and compositional principle,and the philosophy of Wittgenstein can be correctly understood only if we reconcile these apparently opposing perspectives.

关 键 词：《逻辑哲学论》 无意义 语境原则 构成性原则 

分 类 号：B085[哲学宗教—哲学理论]