需求和回收努力扰动下闭环供应链定价与协调  

Coordination and price analysis for closed-loop supply chain with market demand and collection effort disruptions

作　　者：王银河[1] 王旭[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学机械工程学院,重庆400030 [2]重庆大学科技处,重庆400030

出　　处：《计算机应用研究》2013年第7期1975-1978,1982,共5页Application Research of Computers

基　　金：国家软科学研究计划项目(2009GXQ6D178);国家社会科学基金项目(11BGL006)

摘　　要：针对干扰事件下由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的闭环供应链系统,建立制造商为主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,首先分析了数量折扣契约对闭环供应链的协调作用,然后分析了数量折扣契约应对干扰事件的协调作用。结果表明,当干扰事件引起市场规模、再制造成本、回收努力同时扰动时,原契约具有一定鲁棒性;当扰动超出一定范围时,原有的协调被打破;为此,给出改进的数量折扣契约具有抗干扰事件性,并讨论闭环供应链成员的最优利润分配策略,最后通过数值实验来验证结论的有效性。Under the disruption event environment,this paper studied the system of closed-loop supply chain composed the single manufacturer and the single retailer.It established a Stackelberg game model as the supplier was the leader,analyzed the coordination with quantity discount contract firstly.Then,it studied the coordination with quantity discount contract under disruptions.It proved that,the original contracts had certain robustness under a small disruption when disrupted the market scale,remanufacturing cost and collection effort simultaneously.But the coordination might be broken off when the disruptions exceeded a certain range,and adjusted quantity discount contract was proposed which had anti-disruption event ability.It also analyzed the distribution strategy of profit among the entities.Finally,it gave a numerical example to the conclusions efficiency.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 干扰管理 回收努力程度 数量折扣契约 协调机制 

分 类 号：TP301.6[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]