相乘型需求下基于广告合作的供应链协调研究  

Study on Supply Chain Coordination Based on the Cooperative Advertisingunder Multiplicative Demand

作　　者：冯庆华[1,2] 陈菊红[1] 刘通[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,西安710054 [2]西安财经学院信息学院,西安710100

出　　处：《软科学》2013年第7期24-27,共4页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272117);陕西省科技计划项目(2009K01-93);陕西省高校重点学科项目(107-00X902);陕西省教育厅项目(12JK0023)

摘　　要：考虑市场需求受到零售价格和广告投入的双重影响,需求函数为相乘型形式,建立了Nash静态博弈、制造商为主导的Stackelberg博弈、零售商为主导的Stackelberg博弈和合作博弈模型,并对四种模型的均衡结果进行比较,得出了非合作博弈中,在零售商为主导的Stackelberg博弈下制造商获得了更高的收益,但没有分担零售商的地方广告投入。在制造商为主导的Stackelberg博弈下,制造商分担零售商的地方广告投入需要满足一定的条件。而合作博弈以最低的零售价格、最高的地方广告分担率和最高的广告投入获得了比非合作博弈下更高的收益,更好地协调了供应链。Considers the market demand influenced by the retail price and the advertising expenses, market demand function for multiplicative -type, this paper builds up the Nash static game, manufacturer- Stackelberg game, retailer -Stackelberg game and cooperative game models, and then compares equilibrium results of four models. It is concluded that in the non - cooperative game, the manufacturer of the retailer - Stackelberg game gains the higher profits and no local advertising share rate for the retail. The manufacturer of the manufacturer - Stackelberg game shares the retailer＇s local advertising expense need to meet the certain condition. Cooperative game gains the lowest retail price, the highest advertising share rate, the highest local advertising expenses and the highest profits than non - cooperative game, and better coordinate the supply chain.

关 键 词：广告合作 供应链 协调 博弈 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济] F274