无限次重复博弈下批发价格契约参数分析  

The Parameter Analysis of Wholesale Price Contract under Infinitely Repeated Game

作　　者：蹇明[1] 魏菲[1] 吴丹[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院,成都610039

出　　处：《商业研究》2013年第7期51-56,共6页Commercial Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目;项目编号:10CGL013;四川省科技规划项目;项目编号:2009ZR0069;成都市科技计划项目;项目编号:10RKYB092ZF

摘　　要：批发价格契约是使用范围最广的供应链契约,但是基本的批发价格契约不能达到供应链协调。本研究表明在无限次重复博弈供应链中,供应商和零售商的批发价格合作区间相对于最大的批发价格合作区间在缩小;冷酷战略改进后的批发价格契约在使供应链效率达到最优的同时,增加了供应商和零售商的利润。Wholesale price contract is a supply chain contract with the most extensive range of application, but the basic wholesale price contract cannot achieve supply chain coordination. The results show that suppliers and retailers＇ whole- sale price cooperative interval is narrowing compared with the maximum wholesale price cooperative interval under the in- finitely repeated game supply chain; wholesale price contract improved by grim strategy increased suppliers and retailers＇ profits when the supply chain efficiency is optimal.

关 键 词：批发价格契约 冷酷战略 Rubinstein讨价还价 

分 类 号：F252.2[经济管理—国民经济]