非信息对称下的保障性住房项目委托代理激励模型研究  

Research on Principal-Agent Model of Indemnificatory Housing Project under the Non-symmetry of Information

作　　者：刘亚臣[1] 姜依岑[1] 牛思琦[1] 

机构地区：[1]沈阳建筑大学管理学院,辽宁沈阳110168

出　　处：《沈阳建筑大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第2期163-165,共3页Journal of Shenyang Jianzhu University:Social Science

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(12YJC630122)

摘　　要：对保障性住房项目中的政府和代建单位之间委托-代理关系进行分析,在非信息对称的情况下,本着双方自身效益最大化的原则,对委托-代理理论的目标函数和约束条件进行建模求解,为政府正确选择代建单位以及利益分配提供理论依据。This paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship between the government and the construction agent unit on indemnificatory housing project. In the case of non-symmetric information, based on the prin- ciple of maximizing both their own benefits, this article makes models of the objective function and con- straints of the pfincipal-agent theory to analyze this problem. This can also provide a theoretical basis for the government to choose a fight construction unit and distribute the benefits properly.

关 键 词：保障性住房项目 委托-代理理论 代建制 激励模型 

分 类 号：F293.346[经济管理—国民经济]