论20世纪60年代美国对以色列的核不扩散政策  

The U. S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy toward Israel in the 1960s

作　　者：王震[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海社会科学院世界中国学研究所,200235

出　　处：《国际政治研究》2013年第2期98-116,8-9,共19页The Journal of International Studies

摘　　要：从艾森豪威尔到约翰逊期间的美国政府都曾试图阻止以色列发展核武器,并为此进行了一系列交涉,而认知偏差、国内政治掣肘,以及政策杠杆和政策连贯性缺乏等因素影响了这一政策的效果,最终使美国错失了阻止以色列拥有核武器的最佳时机。美国在以色列核项目上的交涉失败反映了其在核不扩散问题上所面临的一系列内在困境,比如,核不扩散政策的道义目标与现实利益诉求之间的矛盾、政策目标与政策杠杆之间的"差距"等。从理论上说,美国并不希望除自己以外的其他任何国家获得核武器,以便通过对核武器的垄断来实现自身安全,这也是战后美国核不扩散政策的本质所在。然而,在现实中,美国又不得不根据自身利益和能力而采取"有所选择"的核不扩散政策。这与其说是一种"双重标准"政策,倒不如说是一种典型的"实用主义"或"机会主义"政策,因为它更多地体现为核不扩散政策的最终效果,而非政策选择本身。Successive U.S.administrations from Eisenhower to Johnson attempted to prevent Israel from developing nuclear weapons.However,due to misperception,domestic political constraints,and the lack of policy leverage and policy consistence,they ultimately missed the best timing of stopping the Israeli nuclear program.The U.S.failure as regards Israel was a reflection of a series of inherent dilemmas in its non-proliferation policy,such as the contradiction between moral objectives and materia-listic interests,the'gap'between policy goals and policy leverage,etc.In principle,the U.S.did not want any other country to acquire nuclear weapons so as to maintain its monopoly status and preserve its security interests,which was the essence of its postwar non-proliferation policy.In reality,however,the U.S.had to carry out a 'selective'policy in accordance with its own interests and capabilities.This is not so much a 'double standard'policy as a typical 'pragmatic'or 'opportunistic' policy,as it has manifested itself more in the policy consequences of non-proliferation than in the policy choices themselves.

关 键 词：地区与国别政治 美国 以色列 核不扩散 迪莫纳 

分 类 号：D815.2[政治法律—国际关系]