承销商自主配售新股问题研究综述  

A Review of the Study on Underwriters Allocate New Issues Discriminatorily and its Edification

作　　者：郑琦[1] 薛爽[2] 

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学经济与管理学院,长沙湖南410004 [2]上海财经大学会计学院,上海200433

出　　处：《首都经济贸易大学学报》2013年第4期106-116,共11页Journal of Capital University of Economics and Business

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目<会计师事务所内部风险控制;市场竞争与签字会计师配置>(71172143);国家社会科学基金项目<我国大型工程项目投融资风险监控研究>(10CGL063);湖南省自然科学基金项目<基于实物期权法的企业投融资耦合决策机理及应用研究>(10JJ4049);湖南省现代企业管理研究中心资助项目<投资者异质信息与新上市公司股价表现>(13QGB2)

摘　　要：本文系统地回顾了承销商自主配售新股的文献,这些文献分别从信息吸引观和代理问题观来研究和解释自主配售的经济后果。信息吸引观认为承销商利用自主配售权回报那些为新股定价提供有用信息的投资者以获取定价相关的信息。代理问题观认为承销商利用自主配售权和投资者进行利益交换以达到自利的目的。在对文献全面梳理的基础上,本文对两类研究的关系、可能存在的问题等进行了述评。中国目前还不允许承销商自主配售新股,而给予承销商自主配售新股权利是未来新股发售机制改革的方向之一。论文就此提出了相关政策建议,以期对承销商自主配售新股的政策制订有所借鉴。This paper reviews the literature on the topic of ly. There are two streams to explain the economic consequence of tion theories regard the allocation of new issues as an inducement underwriters allocate new issues discriminatori- discriminatory allocation. The information revela- to elicit information from investors who know the value of the firm more than others. The principal - agent model highlights the potential for agency problems between the invest bank and the issuing firm and underwriters using allocation right to exchange interest for themselves. This paper compares the two streams of studies and discusses the potential problems. The invest banks in China could not allocate new issues as they wish at the present. Giving the underwriters the right to allocate new issues discriminato- rily might be the next step of the IPO reform in China, and this paper gives some policy suggestions to keep the re- form playing a positive role.

关 键 词：承销商 自主配售 询价制 首次公开发行 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]