机构投资者持股与公司治理间关系的实证研究——基于代理成本的视角  

Empirical Study on Relationship between Institutional Shareholding and Corporate Governance: From Pespective of Agency Cost

作　　者：戴嘉贺 刘可[1] 杨竹清[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学经济学院金融系,广州510632

出　　处：《技术经济》2013年第7期109-116,共8页Journal of Technology Economics

摘　　要：利用2001—2011年我国上市公司的相关数据,从代理成本的视角,对机构投资者在强化上市公司的外部监督、改善公司内部治理方面的作用进行了研究。实证结果显示:机构投资者的存在及发展能够完善公司治理、降低管理层的代理成本,但该影响的经济效果较微弱。指出:有必要进一步创造条件,促使机构投资者在提升公司治理水平、促进证券市场健康发展方面发挥更大作用。Using the data Of China＇s listed companies from 2001 to 2011, this paper empirically studies the effect of institutional investor on strengthening external supervision and improving internal corporate governance from the perspective of agency cost. The result shows as fol- lows..the existence and development of institutional investors do improve corporate governance,and then make agency cost lower, but the eco- nomic effect is very tiny. Finally,it points out that further steps should be taken to promote institutional investors to play more positive roles on corporate governance and stock market＇s development.

关 键 词：机构投资者 机构持股 公司治理 代理成本 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F270F224