基于信号博弈的内部控制一般缺陷披露研究  

Research on General Weakness Disclosure of Internal Control Based on the Signaling Game

作　　者：刘焱[1] 姚海鑫[1] 姚舜怀[2] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学商学院,辽宁沈阳110036 [2]北京大学物理学院,北京100871

出　　处：《东北大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第4期361-366,380,共7页Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(09BJY056);辽宁省科学技术计划资助项目(2012220035);辽宁大学青年科研基金资助项目(2012LDQN26);辽宁大学亚洲研究中心资助项目(201306)

摘　　要：从上市公司披露内部控制一般缺陷的自愿性动机出发,构建了不完全信息条件下公司内部控制一般缺陷披露问题的信号博弈模型,给出了自愿披露内部控制一般缺陷的混同均衡和分离均衡条件;同时对2011年沪深两市上市公司内部控制一般缺陷的披露情况进行了描述性统计,研究结果表明:剔除ST类公司,披露内部控制一般缺陷公司的绩效要好于行业均值。由于现存规章制度中的惩罚机制不够完善,因此对于内部控制一般缺陷的披露现状,市场上更多的是混同均衡,分离均衡尚未实现。Based on the listed companies＇ voluntary motivation of disclosing their general weaknesses of internal control, this paper constructs a signaling game model on the general weaknesses of internal control under the situation of incomplete information, and gives the conditions of pooling equilibrium and separating equilibrium on disclosing voluntarily the general weaknesses of internal control. Moreover, it provides the relevant descriptive statistics about the general weakness disclosure of internal control of all the 2011 listed companies, and finds that excluding ST companies, the performance of general weakness disclosure companies is better than that of the average industry. Given that the current punishment mechanism is not perfect, the market is inclined to choose pooling equilibrium while separating equilibrium has not been realized in the general weakness disclosure of internal control.

关 键 词：内部控制 信息披露 自愿披露 信号博弈 

分 类 号：F239.1[经济管理—会计学]