药品集中招标采购中的反横向串谋合同设计  

Inversed Transverse Collusion Contract of Medicine Centralized Bid Procurement

作　　者：常峰[1] 李思函[1] 苏涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国药科大学医药产业发展研究中心,南京211198

出　　处：《中国药房》2013年第28期2614-2617,共4页China Pharmacy

摘　　要：目的:为完善药品集中招标采购、规避制药厂商串谋行为提供参考。方法:以博弈论为基础,分析我国药品集中招标采购中串谋行为的影响因素,建立药品招标竞价模型,并设计反横向串谋合同。结果:通过模型分析,本研究得出了反横向串谋合同的设计公式。由公式可得,合同定价随着参与人数的增多而降低;采购量随着参与串谋后实际竞标人数的减少而增加,并随着生产厂商、产品的质量层次、需求的增加而减少;合谋价格越高,采购量越低。结论:建议建立以疾病种类为单位招标药品的全国性招标平台和充分竞争的招标市场环境,医疗卫生机构也应在招标前隐蔽具体的采购量,并建立以疾病分类的药品价格评估系统,以减少制药厂商串谋。OBJECTIVE： To put forward specific recommendations for perfecting medicine centralized bid procurement. METH- ODS： Based on the game theory, inversed transverse collusion contract was designed to guide bid behavior. RESULTS： After ana- lyzing model, the formula of inversed transverse collusion contract was obtained in the study. With the formula, contract pricing de- creased with the increase of the number of participants; the purchasing quantity increased with the decrease of actual number of bid- der after collusion while decreased with the increase of manufactures, product quality and demand; the higher conspired price was, the lower purchasing quantity was. CONCLUSIONS ： It is suggested to establish national bidding platform of drug bidding by dis- eases and bidding environment with adequate competition; medical institutions conceal the purchasing quantity before bidding and establish drug price evaluation system by types of disease to reduce the collusion of pharmaceutical manufacturers.

关 键 词：药品 反横向串谋合同 设计 招投标 

分 类 号：R95[医药卫生—药学]