论高质量审计与提升负债的治理效应——基于代理成本与代理效率视角的经验检验  

High Quality Audit Help and the Governance Effect of Bebt——Evidence from the View of Agency Cost and Agency Efficiency

作　　者：廖义刚[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2013年第4期72-77,共6页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC790161);国家自然科学基金项目(71162009;71162010)

摘　　要：以2007～2010年我国A股上市公司为样本,分别从代理成本和代理效率的视角考察了高质量审计是否有助于提升负债的治理功效。研究发现:高质量审计与短期借款之间存在协同治理效应,该效应有助于提升代理效率但无助于降低代理成本;进一步地,高质量审计与短期借款之间的协同治理效应仅显著存在于金融发展水平高地区的上市公司中。此外,附加检验的结果显示,高质量审计有助于透过改进代理效率提升商业信用的治理功效且这一效应只在法治化程度较高地区的上市公司中存在。上述研究结论揭示了我国当前制度环境下高质量审计提升债务治理功效的路径及影响因素。Selecting the listed companies from 2007 to 2010 in China＇s A share market as samples, the problem whether high quality audit can improve the debt management has been researched from the view of agency cost and agency efficiency. It is found that there is some effect between high quality audit and short term debt, which improve agency efficiency while increase agency cost at the same time. And this kind of effect only can be found in listed companies in area with well developed finance. Moreover, it is found that high quality audit can improve agency efficiency by optimize the commercial credit management in the listed companies in area with well developed legal system. Therefore, the effect factors of improving debt management have been discovered.

关 键 词：高质量审计 债务治理代理 成本代理效率 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]