政治联系、薪酬差距与薪酬粘性--基于民营上市公司的经验证据  

Political Connections, Compensation Gap and Compensation Stickiness:Evidence from Chinese Private Listed Firms

作　　者：章永奎[1] 冯文滔[1] 杜兴强[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院

出　　处：《投资研究》2013年第6期127-143,共17页Review of Investment Studies

摘　　要：本文以2005年到2010年的民营公司为样本,实证研究了政治联系对薪酬差距、薪酬差距粘性的影响。研究结果表明,政治联系显著增加了民营上市公司的内部薪酬差距,同时也显著增加了民营上市公司薪酬差距的粘性。即业绩变动一个单位的情况下,业绩下降导致的政治联系的民营上市公司的内部薪酬差距减少的幅度显著低于业绩增加时薪酬差距增加的幅度。本文的研究结果表明,高管的政治联系在一定程度上削弱了民营上市公司薪酬激励契约的有效性。This paper studies the effect of political connections on compensation gap and compensation stickiness by taking the data of Chinese private listed firms from 2005 to 2010 as a sample. The results of the study show that political connections do increase the internal compensation gap within private listed finns. Furthermore, political connections significantly increase the stickiness of private listed firms＇ compensation gap, i.e., in the case of private listed firms with political connections, when per- formance changes for one unit, the degree of decrease in internal compensation gap at the time of performance decreasing is significantly lower than the degree of increase in internal compensation gap at the time of performance increasing. The results of the study show that the executives＇ political connections do affect the compensation arrangement in private listed firms, and to some degree, impair the effectiveness of private listed firms＇ compensation incentive contract.

关 键 词：政治联系 薪酬差距 薪酬粘性 

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