商贸平台的垄断势力与垄断行为研究:基于通道费视角  

Monopoly and Monopolistic Behavior of Trading Platform: Based on the Perspective of Slotting Allowance

作　　者：邱毅[1] 郑勇军[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学现代商贸研究中心,浙江杭州310035

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2013年第7期13-19,共7页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社科重点研究基地项目"交易方式变革与中国流通现代化研究"(10JJD790022);浙江省社会科学规划项目"我国商贸平台型企业公司治理结构研究"(10JDSM01Z);浙江省教育厅项目"基于利益相关者理论的公司治理结构演化研究"(Y200906811)

摘　　要：在我国流通产业集中度不断提高的背景下,大型商贸平台商利用其垄断势力以收取通道费的形式向制造商、经销商和代理商等商户实施垄断行为。文章通过构建拥有竞争优势和处在竞争劣势的两个商贸平台商之间的价格竞争模型,分析这一现象的成因及其对流通产业组织的影响。研究表明:商贸平台的垄断势力和垄断行为之间表现出自我强化的特征,具有竞争优势的商贸平台可以通过向商户收取通道费和对采购者实施低价策略获得更大的市场份额和更高的利润水平,而且其实施低价策略的成本将完全由商户承担。在不受政策等外生变量约束的条件下,伴随着商贸平台商的市场势力增强,必然会出现收取通道费等垄断现象,从而解释为什么流通部分领域会出现了"一家独大"、"越大越强"的局面。因此,政府有必要对这类垄断行为实施规制。With the background of the increasing of concentration in China＇s circulation industry, a number of big trading platforms implement monopolistic behavior with their monopoly power by means of charging slotting allowance from suppliers. This paper used a price competition model which contains two kinds of trading platform to analyze causes of such phenomenon and effect of industry organization of circulation. This research showed that： there were characteristics of self-reinforcement between monopoly and monopolistic behavior of trading platform. An advantage platform could get a bigger market share and a higher profit by charging slotting allowance from suppliers and making a lower price for consumers, but the cost of making lower price will be paid by its suppliers. Therefore, if without some constraints policy, the increase of a trade platform＇s market power would be accompanied by the charging of slotting allowance, so government should consider importing competitive factors to regulate such kind of monopoly behavior.

关 键 词：商贸平台 垄断势力 垄断行为 通道费 

分 类 号：F724.3[经济管理—产业经济]