政府引导对制造商回收的闭环供应链效率影响分析  

Efficiency Influence Analysis of Government Guidance for Closed-loop Supply Chain

作　　者：雷飞 

机构地区：[1]中铁资源集团有限公司,北京100000

出　　处：《物流科技》2013年第8期79-83,共5页Logistics Sci-Tech

摘　　要：文章以博弈论为基本方法,研究了在制造商为绝对的领导者和制造商负责回收的再制造闭环供应链中,政府引导对于制造商延伸责任制下的整个闭环供应链的效率影响。研究发现,政府引导下的社会福利大于无政府引导下的社会福利,并且制造商对废旧产品的回收率大大增加了。在政府引导机制下,由于回收率的增加,使得制造商的生产成本大大节约了,从而对零售商的批发价降低,最终影响零售商对产品的零售价格的制定,使得零售价格相较于无政府引导时大大利于消费者。并且还发现当制造商从废旧产品中节约的成本大于一定值时,政府的奖惩力度会随着节约成本的增大而增大;同时,当制造商从废旧产品中节约的成本小于一定值时,政府的奖惩力度会随着节约成本的增大而减小。这对政府实施相关政策提供了相应的理论支持。This paper regards the game theory as the basic method,researches the efficiency influence about government guidance for manufacturers to extend the responsibility system under the entire closed-loop supply chain in the condition of manufacturers as the absolute leader and in responsible for recycling.The study found that,under the guidance of the government＇s social welfare more than anarchy,and manufacturers＇ recovery to waste products has greatly increased.In the government guidance mechanism,due to the increase of recovery,making the manufacturer＇s production cost greatly reduce,so as to reduce the wholesale price of retailers,and finally influence retailers to the retail prices of product of formulation,making the retail price compared with non-governmental guide benefit consumers greatly.And also found that when the saving cost of manufacturers from waste products more than a certain value,the rewards and penalties of the government with saving cost increases;At the same time,when saving costs of manufacturers from waste products less than a certain value,the rewards and penalties of the government with saving cost is decreased.This paper provides the corresponding theoretical support for the government to implement the relevant policies.

关 键 词：博弈论 闭环供应链 政府引导 

分 类 号：F252.19[经济管理—国民经济]