代理成本、避税程度与上市公司会计信息披露质量  

Agency Costs, Level of Tax Avoidance and the Quality of Accounting Information Disclosure

作　　者：唐建新[1] 陈略[1] 唐春娇[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2013年第7期3-6,129,共4页Communication of Finance and Accounting

摘　　要：代理问题和信息披露长期以来到学术界广泛关注,但将企业避税纳入委托代理观,分析其对信息披露质量影响的研究尚少。本文以深圳证券交易所2001年至2008的上市公司为研究对象,分析了避税程度与信息披露的关系。结果表明,企业避税程度对会计信息披露的质量起到抑制作用,避税程度越高的公司信息披露质量越差;代理成本越高的公司进行避税,其信息披露质量越差。Agency problems and accounting information disclosure have long been concerned. Literatures that study the quality of accounting informationdisclosure from the aspect of agency problems are fairly rich, but there are few studies put corporate tax avoidance into agent-concept to analyze its influenceon information quality. Based on agency perspective on tax avoidance, our study uses Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies’2001-2008 data to discussthe relationship between corporate tax avoidance and information disclosure, and agency cost’s impact on their relation. We find that the level of tax avoidanceis negatively related to information disclosure, the higher avoidance level the worse disclosure quality. What’s more, corporations with high agency cost do taxavoidance will have much worse information disclosure.

关 键 词：会计信息披露质量 避税程度 代理成本 

分 类 号：F233[经济管理—会计学] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]