基于对手报价预测的流域梯级水电站联盟博弈  

Coalitional Game for Cascaded Hydropower Stations Based on Prediction of Opponent's Pricing

作　　者：宋恒力[1,2] 岳超源[1] 韩守东[1] 韩珝[3] 庄凌凌 周祎[3] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学系统工程研究所,湖北武汉430074 [2]中国地质大学(武汉)机械与电子信息学院,湖北武汉430074 [3]华能澜沧江水电有限公司,云南昆明650214

出　　处：《水电能源科学》2013年第8期70-73,共4页Water Resources and Power

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(61105006)

摘　　要：为分析电力市场下流域梯级水电站的联盟策略,结合梯级水电站自身特点与发电约束,剖析流域上不同投资主体水电站的潜在联盟结构,建立联盟博弈模型,并采用改进的灰色GM(1,1)模型预测市场中对手的报价,以解决博弈的不完全信息问题。以某梯级水电站为例,探讨了梯级水电站不同联盟结构的形成条件。结果表明,市场需求弹性系数越高,梯级水电站的结盟偏好越显著。To analyze the coalition strategy of cascaded hydropower stations in electricity market, a coalition game model with constraints of the hydropower＇s technical and economic characteristics is proposed. Different potential coalition structures of cascaded hydropower stations belonging to different investors are discussed. An improved GM （1,1） grey model is used to predict opponent＇s pricing and solve the incomplete information game problem in electricity market. The coalition forming condition is test on a cascaded power system along a certain river. The results show that a higher de- mand elasticity coefficient implies the more intensive preference of forming cascaded reservoir coalition.

关 键 词：流域梯级水电站 联盟博弈 报价预测 灰色理论 

分 类 号：TV697.12[水利工程—水利水电工程] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]