逻辑哲学视野下的“事实”新论  

Some New Views on Facts from Philosophy of Logic

作　　者：秦波[1] 胡泽洪[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学政治与行政学院,广州510631

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2013年第8期32-37,共6页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：2011年度广东省哲学社会科学规划项目"现代逻辑视野中的当代真理论研究"(GD11XZX01)

摘　　要：通过诉诸逻辑哲学中实在主义的认识论、克里普克的本质主义等理论,对"事实"概念及相关对象进行分析,可以得出一些关于事实的新的认识:在一定语境下的事物即事实;生活中的一些事物本身确实存在真假之别;事实并非必真,也有假象事实。By analyzing facts and related objects,we come up with some new ideas which are based on realistic epistemolog ,Kripke＇s essentialism and relevant theories in philosophy of logic.Namely, the thing is the fact in specific contexts; we can talk directly about that some things themselves are true or false＇facts are not equivalent to the whole truth and there exist superficial facts which eclips the whole truth.The new understanding about facts contributes to the safeguard of the uniform cognitive standard of facts.

关 键 词：事实 实在 事物 现象 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]