协同发展下高校教学岗与科研岗最优收益分配激励机制  

The Optimal Income Distribution Incentive Mechanism for Education and Research of Colleges and Universities Considering Coordination Development

作　　者：宋寒[1] 代应[1] 吴庆[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆理工大学工商管理学院,重庆400054 [2]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都611731

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2013年第15期89-92,共4页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"第三方物流服务提供商与客户企业的协调合同及应用研究"(70902019);重庆市高等教育教学改革研究项目"面向制造业需求的物流管理应用型人才培养模式研究与实践"(113139)

摘　　要：针对高校教学与科研发展不平衡问题,建立收益分配激励模型,并通过模型求解,分析促进高校教学与科研协同发展的机制。研究表明,当科研产出弹性系数小于二分之一时,实现高校系统最优的科研产出分配比例大于其产出弹性系数,且随着科研产出弹性系数增加,最优分配比例增加,但增加的速度应减少;反之,当科研产出弹性系数大于二分之一时,实现高校教育科研系统最优的科研产出分配比例小于其产出弹性系数,且随着科研产出弹性系数增加,最优分配比例增加,但增加的速度应加快。Focusing on the problem that the education and research developments of colleges and universities are unbalanced, a principal - agent model for profit distribution is designed. The coordination development mechanism for education and research of colleges and universities is analyzed. The results indicate that when the research output elastic coefficient is less than 1/2, the optimal research output distribution ratio is greater than its output elasticity; with the research output elastic coefficient increasing, the optimal research output distribution ratio increases, but the increase rate should be reduced. Conversely, when the research output elastic coefficient is greater than 1/2, the optimal research output distribution ratio is less than its output elasticity; with the research output elastic coefficient increasing, the optimal research output dis- tribution ratio increases, but the increase rate should be increased.

关 键 词：委托代理模型 教学与科研 协同发展 收益分配机制 

分 类 号：G647[文化科学—高等教育学]