引导基金模式下的政府补偿及其激励效应  

Government's compensation mechanisms and their incentive effects under FOF institution

作　　者：熊维勤[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆工商大学经济学院,重庆400067

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2013年第8期1926-1933,共8页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(11XGL003);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09YJC790279)

摘　　要：在激励理论的分析框架下研究了亏损补偿、收益补偿和政府收益固定三种补偿方式对创业投资规模和效率的影响.主要结论包括:亏损补偿会削弱创业投资家努力投入的激励,从而既不利于提高创业投资效率,也不利于扩大创业投资规模;而收益补偿和政府收益固定补偿具有相同的激励特征,它们可以在促进创业投资合作关系形成的同时兼具扩大创业投资规模和提高创业投资效率的功能.并且当政府对创业投资家的激励成本相同时,收益补偿方式对私人投资者的吸引力更强.同时,由于可能破坏创业投资家和私人投资者的有限责任保护,政府收益固定补偿方式的可实施性得不到保证.Three compensation mechanisms, that is loss compensation, revenue compensation and fixed government revenue compensation, and their impacts on venture capital scale and efficiency are studied in the framework of incentive theory. The main conclusions include： loss compensation would undermine the efforts of venture capitalists, which is not conducive to enhancing efficiency and expanding scale of venture capital; revenue compensation and fixed government revenue compensation have the same incentive charac- teristics, they can promote the formation of venture capital partnerships, expand the scale and enhance the efficiency of venture capital at the same time. When government compensated venture capitalist with the same cost, revenue compensation will attract more private investment. Furthermore, due to the possibility of destructing venture capitalists and private investors＇ limited liability protection, the implementability of fixed government revenue compensation can not be guaranteed.

关 键 词：创业引导基金 创业投资基金 补偿机制 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]