引入寻租理论的公立医院公益性问题的监督博弈分析  

Supervision Game Theory Analysis of Public Hospital's Medical Service Behavior by Introducing Rent-seeking Theory

作　　者：黄丁[1] 熊季霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京中医药大学经贸管理学院,江苏南京210046

出　　处：《中国卫生事业管理》2013年第7期484-486,492,共4页Chinese Health Service Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"新医改背景下公立医院法人治理结构对综合绩效影响的理论和实证研究"(编号:71203101);教育部人文社会科学研究项目"基于公益性的公立医院法人治理研究"(编号:10YJC630300)

摘　　要：针对我国公立医院公益性弱化的现实以及党的十八大对于反腐倡廉的要求,在明确政府监管与公立医院公益性经营二者关系的基础上,引入寻租理论相关内容,建立监督博弈模型,分析影响医疗机构选择公益性或营利性经营方式的各种因素,进而提出公立医院回归公益性的策略建议。In view of the dilution of public welfare in public hospital and the anticorruption work emphasized on the 18th National Congress of the CPC, this thesis tries to establish a supervision game model to analyze affected factors of the operation mode （profit-making or nonprofit-making） chosen by the medical agencies. And then according to the factors, the article puts for- ward some suggestions on public hospital regressions the social welfare goal. Before establishing the game model, the relationship between government regulation and public hospital＇s medical service behavior should be clarified and the rent-seeking theory should be taken into account.

关 键 词：公立医院 公益性 寻租 监督博弈 

分 类 号：R197.3[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]