存款保险制度下国有银行对货币政策有效性影响的研究  

The Study of Effect of State-owned Banks on the Effectiveness of the Monetary Policy under the Deposit Insurance System

作　　者：陆岷峰[1] 汪祖刚[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学金融学院,江苏南京210046

出　　处：《天津商务职业学院学报》2013年第2期5-9,共5页Journal of Tianjin College of Commerce

基　　金：江西省社会科学"十一五"(2010年)规划课题"公共舆论事件的社会信任建构研究"系列成果(课题编号:10SH45)

摘　　要：存款保险制度不仅会产生道德风险、逆向选择等微观经济问题,而且会对央行货币政策有效性的宏观经济问题产生影响。本文以家庭、企业和银行三大微观经济主体建立四市场(存款市场、贷款市场、银行同业拆借市场、国债市场)的理论均衡模型,分析了在存款保险制度下国有银行对货币政策传导的影响。在存款保险制度框架下国有银行对货币政策冲击的敏感性明显要低于非国有银行,国有银行将削弱货币政策的有效性,增加了央行货币政策预期目标实现的难度。The deposit insurance system not only generates microeconomic issues such as moral hazard and adverse selection,but also has an impact on the central bank’s monetary policy.Especially the state-owned banks are still in a dominant position in China’s banking industry,the establishment of a deposit insurance system will have an impact on monetary policy transmission.Based on households,firms and banks,establishes a equilibrium model including four markets（deposit market,loan market,the interbank market,the government bond market） to analyze how the state-owned banks effect the monetary policy transmission under the deposit insurance system.It holds that under the deposit insurance system the sensitivity of state-owned banks to the monetary policy is significantly lower than the non-state-owned banks,state-owned banks will undermine the effectiveness of monetary policy,and increase the difficulty of the central bank to achieve the expected objectives.

关 键 词：存款保险制度 国有银行 货币政策 

分 类 号：F822.0[经济管理—财政学]