Kuhn＇s Notion of Theory Choice and the Dual-Process Theory of Cognition  

作　　者：James A. Marcum 

机构地区：[1]Ph.D., Full Professor, Department of Philosophy, Baylor University, USA

出　　处：《Journal of Philosophy Study》2013年第5期353-366,共14页哲学研究（英文版）

摘　　要：In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn claimed that theory choice is a conversion experience and depends upon the personality or psychology of the individual scientist making the choice. Critics charged Kuhn with an irrational and a relativistic position concerning theory choice, arguing he advocated a subjective instead of an objective approach to how scientists choose one theory over another and thereby undercut epistemic accounts for the generation of scientific knowledge. In response to critics Kuhn insisted that his approach, although subjective, was still rational in that the criteria----vomposed of epistemic values--determining theory choice operate both objectively and subjectively. Recent work in cognitive neuropsychology, particularly in the dual-process theory of cognition, supports Kuhn＇s notion of theory choice. In this paper, I initially discuss Kuhn＇s approach to theory choice, along with criticism of it and his response to the criticism, followed by an examination of the dual-process theory of cognition. I then explore the application of dual-process theory to Kuhn＇s notion of theory choice, especially in terms of a historical case study from the biomedical sciences. I finally discuss briefly the implications of the dual-process theory for contemporary philosophy of science.

关 键 词：COGNITION dual-process theory RATIONALITY theory choice VALUES 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学] G301[文化科学]