银行关系是否导致了贷款歧视？--基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据  

Do Bank Connections Really Lead to Discriminatory Lending? Evidence from Listed Companies of China's Private Sector

作　　者：杜颖洁[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院

出　　处：《投资研究》2013年第7期84-107,共24页Review of Investment Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71072053);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目的资助

摘　　要：本文以2004-2010年的民营上市公司为研究对象,实证研究了高管具有的银行关系对公司的银行借款可得性、借款抵押要求以及借款成本的影响。本文研究发现:(1)高管具有的银行关系与民营上市公司的银行借款率显著正相关,且对于市场化程度越低地区的民营上市公司而言,银行关系对借款可得性的影响更显著;(2)高管具有的银行关系与民营上市公司的银行借款期限显著正相关,且相同条件下,具有银行关系的民营上市公司借款时的抵押物要求显著更低;(3)民营上市公司高管具有的银行关系与公司的借款成本显著负相关。Using a sample of Chinese private listed firms for the period 2004-2010, we empirically examine whether and how top managers＇ bank connections cause discriminations in the availability of bank loans, loan collateral, and loan costs, respectively. The results show that： （1） Top managers＇ bank connections significantly increase Chinese private listed firms＇ bank loan ratio, and this effect is strengthened for firms located in provinces with lower Marketization index. （2） Top managers＇ bank connections significantly raise Chinese private listed firms＇ proportion of long-term loans in liabilities and reduce collateral requirements. （3） Chinese private listed firms with bank connections bear significantly lower loan costs than non-bank-connected ones.

关 键 词：银行关系 贷款歧视 民营上市公司 

分 类 号：F832.3[经济管理—金融学] F832.4F276.5