国有银行贷款与股价同步性  

State - owned Bank Loan and Stock Price Synchronicity

作　　者：王艳艳[1] 于李胜[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,361005

出　　处：《会计研究》2013年第7期42-49,96,共8页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71002043;70972114);教育部新世纪优秀人才(NCET-11-0297);福建省新世纪优秀人才(于李胜)和霍英东青年教师基金(131083);中央高校基本科研业务费项目"非金融企业套期保值行为及监管模式研究""审计师个体行为特征与审计质量研究";教育部人文社科重点基地重大项目(2009JJD790041)的资助

摘　　要：由于预算软约束的存在会降低管理层信息披露水平,以及投资者感知的国有企业的破产风险和经营风险水平,进而会影响股价同步性。本文从债权人角度研究了国有银行贷款对股价同步性的影响,以及这种影响在国有企业和非国有企业当中是否存在非对称性。研究结果表明:国有银行贷款比例与股价同步性呈正比,即国有银行贷款比例越高,股价的同步性越大;二者的正相关关系在非国有企业中显著弱于国有企业。进一步将国有银行贷款划分为政策性银行贷款和国有商业银行贷款,将非国有企业划分为具有政治联系的企业和不具有政治联系的企业,结果表明,政策性银行贷款与股价同步性的正相关关系高于国有商业银行,具有政治联系的非国有企业股价同步性与国有企业不存在显著差异。这些结果综合说明,政府的父爱主义以及由此产生的预算软约束是影响股价同步性的重要因素之一。From a banking perspective,this paper investigates the effect of state-owned bank loans on stock-price synchronicity and whether such an effect is asymmetric in SOEs and non-SOEs.The results indicate that the percentage of loans from state banks is positively related to stock-price synchronicity and that such a relationship is significantly weaker in non-SOEs than that in SOEs.When we further divide state-owned banks into policy banks and state-owned commercial banks and divide non-SOEs into firms with political connections and firms without political connections,the results show that the positive relation between loans from policy banks and stock-price synchronicity is higher than that of state-owned commercial banks,while the stock-price synchronicity of politically connected firms is the same as that of SOEs.

关 键 词：预算软约束 股价同步性 国有银行贷款 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F832.4F832.51