专利制度下侵权行为的惩罚机制设计  

Punishment Mechanism Design of Infringement Behavior under the Patent System

作　　者：顾倩倩[1] 孙绍荣[2] 殷时鑫[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海师范大学天华学院,上海201815 [2]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2013年第16期145-148,155,共5页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于符号和结构图及计算的行为管理制度设计方法研究"(70871080);国家自然科学基金项目"行为管理制度漏洞治理设计的工程化方法研究"(71171134);上海市教委科研创新重点项目"基于行为概率的动态税制的符号化设计方法研究"(11ZS138)

摘　　要：采用行为博弈的分析方法建立行为惩罚机制的博弈模型,从定量分析角度研究侵权方实施侵权行为与不实施侵权行为的效用问题;对该博弈模型进行扩展,建立侵权方与政府监管部门之间的混合策略博弈模型并求解和分析该博弈模型纳什均衡的条件。研究表明,建立国家、监管部门和侵权方三者之间的双重惩罚机制,在加强监管力度的基础上增大对侵权方的惩罚强度,一旦发现侵权行为就对其进行严厉惩罚,可有效减少侵权行为的发生。Using the analytical method of behavioral game theory, firstly, we established a game model of the behavior punishment mechanism, and studied the utility of infringement behavior and non - infringement behavior from the perspective of quantitative analysis. Secondly, on the basis of the game model, we built a mixed strategy game model between the infrin- ging party and government regulator, then solved and analyzed the condition of Nash equilibrium of the game model. The research presents it is necessary to establish the double punishment mechanism among the nation, regulator and infringing party. On the basis of strengthening the supervision, regulator should increase the punishment intensity of the infringing party. Once finding infringement behavior, regulator must implement severe punishment. That is effective to reduce the occurrence of infringement.

关 键 词：专利制度 侵权行为 惩罚机制 博弈模型 

分 类 号：D923[政治法律—民商法学]