高管权威影响公司绩效波动吗  

DOES MANAGER POWER AFFECT THE VARIABILITY OF CORPORATE PERFORMANCE

作　　者：杨继东[1] 刘诚[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学经济学院,北京100872 [2]国务院港澳办公室港澳研究所,北京100045

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2013年第8期72-83,共12页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(10YJA790224);北京地区普通高等学校首都经济学科群建设项目(2010010053)

摘　　要：本文试图考察高管权威对公司绩效波动的影响。基于中小板上市公司的数据研究发现,CEO总体权威对绩效波动的影响为正但不显著。CEO不同维度的权威对绩效波动的影响存在差异,位置权威对波动影响为负,声望权威和所有者权威对绩效波动影响为正,地位稳固权威的影响不显著。公司财务约束会抑制CEO权威对绩效波动的影响。本文从高管权威的视角审视公司绩效波动,对完善中国上市公司的治理具有一定借鉴意义。This paper investigates the relationship between manager power and performance variability of listed coporation in China. The result indicates that CEO total power has positive influence on variability of corporate performance, but statistically insignificant different from zero; position power is negatively associated with the variability of annual accounting return, but ownership power and reputation power has positive impact on variability of corporate performance, and entrenchment power has no significant effect. We also find that financial constraint can mitigate the influence of CEO power. The implication of this pa- per can deepen our understanding about how to improve corporate governance in China.

关 键 词：高管权威 绩效波动 财务约束 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F276.6