证券监管机构与上市公司的博弈分析  

Game Theory——Based on the Analysis of Dynamics between Listed Companies and Securities Regulator

作　　者：郝旭光[1] 贺小刚[2] 张嘉祺[1] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京100029 [2]包商银行战略部,包头014030

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2013年第8期19-23,共5页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：2011年国家社科基金重点项目"我国资本市场系统稳定性评估和监测研究"(项目编号11AZD010)

摘　　要：本文应用不完全信息静态博弈理论,分析了中国证券市场中监管机构和上市公司之间的博弈行为。分析结果表明上市公司违规与否取决于监管机构对违规行为的惩罚力度以及监管机构的查处力度。监管达到相对满意的均衡状态是可能的。论文认为,为了提高监管效果,要加强对上市公司违规行为的惩处力度,监管政策法规的制定与颁布应充分考虑市场各参与者的利益。The essay applies the method of the static game theory under incomplete information to analyze the dynamics between Listed Companies and Securities regulator. The result of our analysis shows that the illegal ac- tivities of listed companies depend on the punishments and the investigation that the regulator imposes on them. There is possibility that regulation could reach a relatively satisfactory equilibrium. To improve the effect of regula- tion, we should step up the punishments upon illegal activities of listed companies. And the benefits of different market participants should be fully considered while making and releasing compliance ＆ policies.

关 键 词：不完全信息静态博弈 监管机构 上市公司 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]