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作 者:张斌[1]
出 处:《国际经贸探索》2013年第8期103-114,共12页International Economics and Trade Research
基 金:国家社科基金一般项目(11BGJ012);上海市教委科研创新重点项目(11ZS64)
摘 要:随着中国成为全球和美国反补贴调查主要目标国,反补贴中的价格比较及其度量基准,尤其是与反倾销"替代国价格"类似的"外部基准"问题已日益引起关注。文章通过美国对主要国家反补贴历史案件的统计分析,试图揭示外部基准对市场经济国家的适用,基本结论是:外部基准是美国对外反补贴基本方法,主要适用于基准利率(包括贴现率)和上游投入品基准价格的确定;尽管具体方法与替代国价格基本相似,但采用频率低于内部基准;其适用原因主要是:涉案国金融体系的国家垄断、受补贴企业资信不良、涉案产品上游原材料市场的国家或国有企业垄断。As China has become the major target of both global and US CVD investigations, the price comparison and benchmark in CVD investigations, particularly the external benchmark similar to the surrogate price in anti-dumping investigations, have aroused much attention. This paper, based on the statistical analysis of US historical cases, tries to study the applicability of the external benchmark to market economy countries. It finds that the 6xternal benchmark does constitute one of the basic price comparison methods in US CVD investigations, and is mainly applicable for the determination of benchmark interest (discount) rates and benchmark prices of upstream inputs. Though the method is basically the same as the surrogate price, it is less frequently used than the internal benchmark. The reasons for the US investigating authority to apply the external benchmark include the government predominance of the financial system, the uncreditworthiness of subsidized enterprises and the state monopoly of upstream input markets.
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