评级机构数量选择对企业债券信用风险监管的影响——基于评级机构与发债企业串谋行为的博弈分析  

Influence of the Amount of Rating Agencies on the Credit Risk Supervision of Corporate Bonds ———Based on the Collusion between Rating Agencies and Corporations

作　　者：周宏[1] 温笑天[1] 夏剑超[1] 方宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院,100081

出　　处：《会计研究》2013年第8期76-80,97,共5页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71172152);中央财经大学青年科研创新团队支持计划;"211工程"重点学科建设项目资助

摘　　要：本文以评级机构与发债企业的串谋行为为切入点,分析评级机构的数量选择对企业债券信用风险监管的影响。通过建立博弈模型,本文分析了评级机构数量与串谋风险的关系,结果发现评级机构数量越多,串谋的风险越大。之后,本文进一步分析了评级机构数量与垄断风险和寻租风险间的关系,证明了只有当串谋风险、垄断风险和寻租风险的总和最小时,评级机构数量水平才是最优的。最后,本文给出了相关政策建议。By analyzing the collusion between rating agencies and corporations,this paper analyzes the influence of the amount of rating agencies on the credit risk supervision of corporate bonds.The paper establishes game models to analyze the relation between the amount of rating agencies and the collusion risk.The results show that the collusion risk increases with the amount of rate agencies.Then the paper analyzes the relation between the amount of rating agencies and the monopoly risk and the rent-seeking risk,and proves that the best amount of rating agencies is when the sum of the collusion risk and the monopoly risk and the rent-seeking risk minimizes.At last,some suggestions are offered.

关 键 词：企业债券 信用风险监管 串谋风险 评级机构数量 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]