会计稳健性、管理者过度自信与企业过度投资  

Accounting conservatism,managers’ overconfidence and excessive investment

作　　者：胡国柳[1] 周遂[1] 

机构地区：[1]海南大学经济管理学院,海南海口570228

出　　处：《东南大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2013年第2期50-55,135,共6页Journal of Southeast University(Philosophy and Social Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"高管过度自信扭曲投资的治理机制研究"(71062009);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-10-0123);教育部人文社会科学研究基金(11YJC630067);海南省研究生创新科研课题(Hys2012-23)成果之一

摘　　要：以中国上市公司2007-2010年度数据为样本,在区分了企业产权性质的基础上,对会计稳健性、管理者过度自信与企业过度投资的关系进行了理论分析与实证研究。结果表明,同民营企业相比,国有企业中管理者的过度自信心理对企业过度投资的影响更为显著;会计稳健性能够起到对管理者非理性行为的制约作用,但国有企业的会计稳健性在抑制由于管理者过度自信导致的投资过度方面的作用显著弱于民营企业。Taking the 2007-2010 data of the listed companies in China as the sample and distinguishing the nature of enterprise property rights,this paper makes a theoretical analysis and an empirical research in the relationship between accounting conservatism,managers’ overconfidence and excessive investment.The results show that,compared with private enterprises,overconfidence of managers in state-owned enterprises significantly increased enterprise excess investment,and that accounting conservatism could restrict managers’ irrationality,but accounting conservatism in state-owned enterprise in inhibiting the excess investment resulted from managers’ overconfidence was significantly weaker than that in private enterprises.

关 键 词：会计稳健性 过度自信 过度投资 产权性质 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]