基础设施项目融资中政府担保的套牢问题研究  

Research on the Hold-up Problem in the Infrastructure Project Financing's Government Guarantee

作　　者：李文新[1] 彭文敏[1] 史本山[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2013年第9期70-75,共6页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目(12CGL020);教育部人文社科基金资助项目(12YJA790110);中央高校基本科研业务费专题项目(A0920502051113-67)

摘　　要：政府通过担保吸引非政府投资主体参与基础设施项目融资,基础设施项目的不确定性因素多,政府提供的项目担保可以避免非政府投资主体无法控制的非经营风险,但同时政府担保形成的或有负债给政府带来巨大的负担。由于信息的不对称、参与人的有限理性和契约的不完全性,基础设施项目担保中存在套牢问题。本文简述了政府担保的作用机制,结合期权理论分析了基础设施项目担保中的套牢问题,并分别建立了上限式担保、上下限式担保和比例上下限式担保套牢问题的博弈模型,比较了三种担保方式的优缺点,给出了不同情况下双方的最优决策以及解决套牢问题的措施。The government attract non-government investor taking participate in the infrastructure project financing by providing government guarantee,infrastructure projects have plenty of uncertainty factors.The government provides project guarantee can avoid the business risk that non-governmental investor can＇t control.At the same time the contingent liabilities bring huge burden to government for government guarantee.As the information asymmetry,participant＇s limited rational and contract＇s incompleteness,hold-up problem exists in the guarantee of infrastructure projects.This paper describes the mechanism of the government guarantee,analysis the hold-up problem in the guarantee combined with the option theory,and establishes the game mode respectively of the minimum-style guarantee,upper and lower limits-style guarantee and upper and lower limits-style guarantee in the times of proportion＇s hold-up problem,compared the advantages and disadvantages of three kinds of guarantee way.Finally gives the optimal strategy in different conditions and the measures to solve the hold-up problem.

关 键 词：基础设施 政府担保 套牢问题 非政府投资主体 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]