财政分权、晋升激励与民生公共品偏向——基于全国省级面板数据的实证研究  

Fiscal Decentralization,Promotion Incentives and the Preference of People’s Livelihood Public Goods——An Empirical Analysis Based on Provincial Panel Data in China

作　　者：王询[1] 孟望生[1,2] 张为杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学经济学院,辽宁大连116025 [2]甘肃政法学院经管学院,兰州730070

出　　处：《云南财经大学学报》2013年第4期30-38,共9页Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：辽宁省经济社会发展项目"福利性公共物品有效供给激励研究"(2013lslktjjx-01);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地项目"组织内部契约关系与激励机制设计"(2010CIB01)

摘　　要：当前,中国的政府治理模式对地方政府的财政支出结构产生了深远影响。在财政分权体制下,不同的政绩考核方式会影响地方政府的努力方向,进而导致不同类型公共品的投入偏向。文章通过数理模型对此进行了推导,然后运用1995～2011年的省级面板数据进行检验。回归结果显示,在政治晋升激励下,财政分权显著降低了地方政府在教育、医疗卫生、社会保障方面的投入和环境质量。与此同时,民生权重的增加显著提高了地方政府对以上公共品的投入水平与环境质量。At present,the governance model of Chinese government has made profound impact on the fiscal expenditure structure of local governments.In fiscal decentralization system,different performance evaluation methods influence the striving direction of local governments,which further leads to their investment preference in different kinds of public goods.The paper makes a mathematical deduction to the issue above,and a test is made by using provincial panel data from 1995 to 2011.Regression results show that under the incentives of political promotion,fiscal decentralization significantly decreases local government’s investment in education,medical care,social security and environmental quality.Meanwhile,the increasing importance of people’s livelihood significantly improves local government’s investment level in the above mentioned aspects.

关 键 词：财政分权 晋升激励 民生公共品 财政支出 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学]