特许权价值、隐性保险和银行稳健性——基于中国上市银行的实证检验  

Franchise Value,Implicit Insurance and Bank Stability——Based on the Empirical Test of Listed Banks in China

作　　者：曲洪建[1] 张相贤 王宇明[3,4] 

机构地区：[1]上海工程技术大学市场营销系,上海201620 [2]威海市商业银行,山东威海264200 [3]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051 [4]光大银行黑龙江分行,哈尔滨250014

出　　处：《云南财经大学学报》2013年第4期120-127,共8页Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目"特许权价值;公司治理机制和银行稳健性--中美商业银行的比较研究"(12YJC630157);上海工程技术大学高水平培育项目"‘三位一体制度’对银行稳健性的影响研究--中国上市银行的理论与实证研究"(2012pg33);2011年度山东省博士后创新项目专项资金资助项目"后危机时代山东省城商行现代风险管理体系再造研究--基于巴塞尔新资本协议Ⅰ和Ⅱ的视角(201103017)

摘　　要：在对国内外相关文献梳理的基础上,选取特许权价值、隐性保险、银行规模、政府监管、资本杠杆、经营杠杆和银行稳健性的度量指标,构建计量经济模型,并采用16家中国上市商业银行2000～2011年非平衡面板数据进行实证分析。通过研究发现:特许权价值存在内生自律效应;隐性保险提供的范围涵盖各种商业银行,没有国有和非国有的差异;隐性保险削弱了特许权价值的内生自律效应;银行规模越大,稳健性越好;政府监管降低了银行风险,增强了银行稳健性;中国上市商业银行资本杠杆和经营杠杆效应没有充分发挥作用。Based on the analysis of relative literatures of China and foreign countries,the paper constructs an econometric model by choosing several measurement indexes including franchise value,implicit insurance,bank size,government regulation,capital leverage,operation leverage and bank stability.An empirical analysis is then made by using unbalanced panel data of 16 listed commercial banks in China from 2000 to 2011.Results show that franchise value has endogenous self-regulatory effect;implicit insurance covers all sorts of commercial banks,with no difference in state-owned and non-state-owned banks;implicit insurance weakens the endogenous self regulatory effect of franchise value;the bigger the size of banks,the better the stability;government regulation decreases bank risks while strengthening bank stability;the capital leverage and operation leverage effect of Chinese listed commercial banks haven’t played full roles.

关 键 词：特许权价值 隐性保险 银行稳健性 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学]