个人保险代理人声誉激励机制分析与设计思路——基于重复博弈视角  

Analysis and Design Idea of Individual Insurance Agent's Reputation Incentive Mechanism——Based on the Repeated Game Theory

作　　者：杨敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖北经济学院金融学院,湖北武汉430205

出　　处：《湖北经济学院学报》2013年第4期27-31,共5页Journal of Hubei University of Economics

摘　　要：在重复博弈下,声誉激励机制将对个人保险代理人的诚信经营行为产生积极的激励作用,但声誉激励作用的发挥有严格的前提条件。在我国目前个人保险代理人声誉激励机制弱化甚至缺失的状况下,要通过减少个人保险代理人的流动性、建立个人保险代理人声誉等级制度、培育完善的个人保险代理人市场等措施建立完善的个人保险代理人声誉激励机制,有效地缓解信息不对称条件下日益严重的个人保险代理人道德风险问题。Reputation incentive mechanism will have positive effect on the integrity behavior of personal insurance agents in a repeated game,but there must be strict prerequisites to play the role of reputation incentive mechanism.Currently,reputation incentive mechanism of individual insurance agent weaken or even missing in China,we must reduce the liquidity of individual insurance agents,establish reputation hierarchy of personal insurance agent,cultivate perfect market for personal insurance agent,to design sound reputation incentive mechanism for personal insurance agent,therefore we can decrease moral hazard of personal insurance agent under conditions of asymmetric information.

关 键 词：个人保险代理人 声誉激励机制 道德风险 重复博弈 

分 类 号：F840.32[经济管理—保险]