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机构地区:[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092 [2]江苏大学土木工程与力学学院,江苏镇江212013
出 处:《运筹与管理》2013年第4期60-67,共8页Operations Research and Management Science
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71073110)
摘 要:利益冲突是供应链中的一个共性问题,因而建立合理的利益协调机制对农村土地流转的成功运作无疑是重要的。本文应用博弈论建立了供应链中利益协调的博弈模型——一个两阶段的委托代理模型,以此来分析我国农村土地间接流转模式运作中存在的双重委托代理风险问题,以至于可采取各种措施和手段促进供应链中的信息沟通与协调行为。最后,通过数值模拟与数值算例说明了机制设计的有效性,并对分析结果进行验证。研究结果表明,通过选择合理的机制可以使供应链各成员的期望收益达到帕累托改进,从而实现农村土地间接流转供应链系统的协调。Because the conflicts of benefits are the common problems in the supply chain, so establishing a rational benefits' coordination mechanisms is undoubtedly important to the successful operation of rural land transferring. In this paper, based on the game theory, a model of the benefits' coordination mechanism, i. e a twostage' s principal-agent model, is set up to analyze the moral risk problems of the double principal-agent, so as to promote communication and coordination behavior by a variety of means and measures. Finally, the validity of the combined mechanism is illustrated by a numerical simulation and a numerical example. It is revealed that via selecting the rational mechanism, each member in the indirect land transferring supply chain can make a Pareto improvement in the expected benefits, and coordination of the indirect land transferring supply chain can be achieved in the end.
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