“短斤少两”现象的博弈模型及对策分析  

A Game Model and Countermeasure on Transaction Cheating Phenomenon

作　　者：黄凤丽[1] 黄晗[2] 冯烽[1,3] 

机构地区：[1]广西财经学院信息与统计学院,广西南宁530003 [2]广西财经学院工商管理学院,广西南宁530003 [3]福州大学管理学院,福建福州350002

出　　处：《广西财经学院学报》2013年第4期86-89,124,共5页Journal of Guangxi University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：用不完全信息动态博弈模型对买卖中的"短斤少两"现象进行分析,按卖家是否作出"承诺"分别进行讨论,得到了相应的子博弈精练贝叶斯纳什均衡解的四个结论,这四个结论合理刻画了买卖双方的市场行为并揭示了"短斤少两"现象难以杜绝的原因。结果表明,诚信交易仅靠买卖双方的力量无法实现,还需要政府实施激励机制。By using the incomplete information dynamic game model,we analyze a cheating phenomenon in the trading transaction. We discuss this phenomenon respectively basing on whether the seller gives a ＂commitment＂,and then get four conclusions corresponding with the Sub-game Refined Bay Esian Nash Equilibrium. The four conclusions reasonably characterize the behavior of buyers and sellers in the market, and explain why it is difficult to stop the cheating phenomenon. The results show that the honesty transactions will not be able to be achieved only depending on the buyers and sellers,so incentive mechanism of government is necessary.

关 键 词：短斤少两 不完全信息动态博弈 纳什均衡 支付函数 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学]