重返利维坦:现代法治的形式与实质——施米特对自由主义法治的批判  

Back to Leviathan: The Form and Content of the Rule of Law in Modern Times——On Schmitt's Critique to the Rule of Law of Liberalism

作　　者：汪栋[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东农业大学法学系,山东泰安271018

出　　处：《华东理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第3期75-84,共10页Journal of East China University of Science and Technology：Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"宪法程序的英国普通法渊源研究"(汪栋主持;编号为10BFX054)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：施米特断言自由主义法治是自相矛盾的概念,自由主义应当为法律提供实质性价值,但是自由主义对多元价值的中立态度,使它实际上不能做到这一点。由于自由主义否定人的政治本性,将政治非政治化,作为实证主义概念天国的法治也就成为徒具形式的空壳。现代政治和法律不能纯粹基于理性和形式,更须重视激情与价值。因此,重返利维坦,意味着国家与法律秩序必须尊崇和平与基本权利价值,重视公民教育,唤起公民内心的忠诚与认同。霍布斯同时推动了现代社会的祛魅和复魅的进程,利维坦既是理性的国家机器,更是令人恐惧的巨兽。遗憾的是施米特没有真正地回归霍布斯,虽然他重新发现了利维坦的意义。Schmitt asserted that the concept of liberalism rule of law is self-contradictive; liberalism should provide substantial content for the law, but its attitude to multiple values is neutrality, therefore, it can＇t do this. Due to denying political nature of human being, liberalism politics is apolitical. According to Schmitt, liberalism politics and law can＇t absolutely found on reason and form, and must attach importance to passion and content. Accordingly, liberalism state and law must regress to Leviathan, cherish the value of peace and rights, and arouse the inner loyalty of citizen.

关 键 词：利维坦 法治 形式 实质 

分 类 号：D90[政治法律—法学理论]