干扰条件下闭环供应链定价决策及契约协调研究  

Research on Contract Coordination and Price Decision of Closed-loop Supply Chain under Disruption Condition

作　　者：王银河[1] 王旭[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学机械工程学院,重庆400030 [2]重庆大学科技处,重庆400030

出　　处：《机械工程学报》2013年第16期185-192,共8页Journal of Mechanical Engineering

基　　金：国家软科学研究计划(2009GXQ6D178);国家社会科学基金(11BGL006)资助项目

摘　　要：在再制造闭环供应链系统实际运作的过程中,干扰事件是不可避免的,闭环供应链如何有效协调应对干扰事件成为一个研究热点。目前,收益共享契约作为广泛应用的协调机制,更能实现闭环供应链各成员的利润共享和风险分担,为此利用收益共享契约来协调干扰事件。在非线性需求条件下,考虑由单一制造商和零售商组成的闭环供应链系统。通过构建Stackelberg博弈模型,研究当干扰事件引起市场需求、再制造成本、回收成本发生扰动时,在集中和分散化决策下闭环供应链的最优决策。结果表明,干扰事件下原有的收益共享契约不再协调闭环供应链,尤其当市场规模扰动超过规定范围时,应调整生产计划并采用新的收益共享契约,从而达到闭环供应链的协调。通过算例验证了相关结论的有效性。In the course of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain system in the actual operation,the disrupt event is inevitable,the closed-loop supply chain system how to coordinate events effectively become a hotspot of research.At present,revenue-sharing contract as a coordination mechanism is used widely,and it more to achieve the various members of the closed-loop supply chain profit sharing and risk sharing.Therefore,revenue-sharing contract to coordinate response to disrupt events is considered.To study a closed-loop supply chain system with single manufacturer and single retailer is established under the demand is unlinear function.When market scale,reproduction cost and collection cost are disrupted simultaneously,a Stackelberg game model is established.The optimal strategies of closed-loop supply chain under the centralized decision and decentralized decision are analyzed.Research result showed that the closed-loop supply chain coordination may be broken off by original revenue-sharing contract under a disruption event.The market disruptions exceeded a certain range when disruption even was happened,the original production plan is adjusted and the new revenue-sharing contract should be designed to coordinate the closed-loop supply chain.Finally,a numerical example is given to the conclusions efficiency.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 生产成本 收益共享契约 干扰管理 协调 

分 类 号：F460[经济管理—产业经济]