考虑政府奖惩的逆向供应链定价策略研究  

Research on Pricing Strategy of the Reverse Supply Chain Considering the Government's Rewards and Punishment

作　　者：李锦飞[1] 刘坪[1] 贡文伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江21013

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2013年第4期109-116,共8页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(10YJA630043);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2011SJB630007);江苏大学高级专业人才科研启动基金项目(11JDG005)

摘　　要：探讨一个制造商和多个零售商组成的逆向供应链定价策略问题,以再制品市场需求信息不完全为前提,运用博弈论和委托代理理论研究分析政府不参与逆向供应链运作、政府对制造商实施奖惩措施和政府对零售商实施奖惩措施三种情形下逆向供应链各主体的定价策略。并通过数值仿真验证了定价策略分别与市场需求和奖惩力度的关系。研究表明:成本较高的零售商期望收益较小;在两种奖惩力度相同的情况下,政府对制造商实施奖惩措施后逆向供应链的整体收益更大,而政府对零售商实施奖惩措施后制造商会更倾向于不传递真实市场信息的信号。The article discusses pricing strategy problem of the reverse supply chain consisted of a manufacturer and multiple retailers. With the remade-products＇ market demand information incomplete as premise, using the game theory and the principal-agent theory to analyze the pricing strategy of the reverse supply chain in three situations such as when government does not participate in reverse supply chain operation, when government implements reward and punishment policy to the manufacturer and when government implements reward and punishment policy to retailers. Also, the relationship between pricing strategies and market requirements or punishment strengths is been proved through numerical simulation. The study shows that： retailers with higher cost expect less profit. Under the condition that two kinds of rewards and punishment strength is equal, when government implements rewards and punishment policy to manufacturer, the reverse supply chain obtains more overall revenue , but when government implements rewards and punishment policy to conceal real market information signal. to retailers, the manufacturer will have more tendency

关 键 词：逆向供应链 定价策略 不完全信息 政府引导 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]