基于机制设计理论的建设工程招标最优机制设计  

Optimal Mechanism Design for Construction Project Bidding Based on Mechanism Design Theory

作　　者：王卓甫[1] 丁继勇[1,2] 周建春[1] 张怡[1] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学,江苏南京210098 [2]宾夕法尼亚州立大学,美国州学院,pa16802

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第5期73-78,共6页Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(06BJY085);住房和城乡建设部软科学研究项目(2008-R3-15);国家留学基金项目(201206710036)

摘　　要：在分析建设工程交易特点的基础上,借助机制设计理论,以招标人总成本最小作为目标函数,将参与约束、激励相容约束以及技术能力、支付能力和控制价等作为约束条件,构建了建设工程招标机制模型;针对建设工程交易特点,借鉴Myerson的最优拍卖理论,对招标机制模型进行了分析,提出了相应的简化模型;根据模型的构建及分析过程,提出了建设工程招标最优机制的应用程序,并探讨了相关参数的确定方法。研究成果为建设工程招标机制设计提供了一般性框架,建设工程招标机制的详细设计还有待进一步研究。Based on analysis of the characteristics of construction project transaction, this paper constructs a construction project bidding model by using mechanism design theory, with the minimum total cost of the tenderee as objective function, while participation constraint, incentive compatibility constraint, technical ability, and control price etc. as constraints. According to the characteristics analyzes the model with the help of Myerson＇ s optimal auction fled model. Finally, according to the construction and analysis the optimal bidding mechanism, and discusses the calculation suits provide a general framework for the mechanism design of sign still needs further study of construction project transaction, this paper then theory, and puts forward the corresponding simpli- process, this paper proposes the application steps of method of the related parameters. The research reconstruction project bidding, while the detailed design still needs further study.

关 键 词：建设工程 招标 机制设计 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]